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Abstract
This study explores the evolution of income inequality in an economy featuring an
endogenous transition from stagnation to growth. We incorporate heterogeneous house-
holds into a Schumpeterian model of endogenous takeoff. In the pre-industrial era, the
economy is in stagnation, and income inequality is determined by an unequal distri-
bution of land ownership and remains stationary. When takeoff occurs, the economy
experiences innovation and economic growth. In this industrial era, income inequality
gradually rises until the economy reaches the balanced growth path. We calibrate the
model for a quantitative analysis and compare the simulation results to historical data
in the UK. Extending the analysis to allow for endogenous labor supply, we find that
endogenous labor supply introduces a channel through which inequality contributes to
shaping the transition path of the economy and that households sort themselves into
a leisure class that supply zero labor and the rest of society that supplies labor.
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What is the historical relationship between growth and inequality and, if any, what drives it?
These questions have a long tradition in economics. Kuznets (1955) famously hypothesized
that industrialization causes income inequality to rise. Williamson (1980, 1985) provides
evidence for this hypothesis, showing that in Britain income inequality increases after the
Industrial Revolution and keeps rising until the mid-19th century.1 More broadly, there
is abundant evidence that periods characterized by waves of innovation in technology and
business organization (e.g., the period straddling the second half of the 19th century and
the pre-wars 20th century) display higher and rising inequality. History thus suggests that
innovation-driven growth accelerations cause rising inequality. The recent study by Madsen
et al. (2021) makes this point quite forcefully. It carries out "a long-run econometric analysis
for 21 OECD countries using annual data over the period 1860—2015" (p. 477) and shows
that "intangibles have been a contributing factor in wealth inequality since 1860 and that
the marked increase in investment in intangible assets has been a significant driver of the
increasing inequality since the 1970s" (p. 477). The takeaway of the paper is that growth
accelerations fueled by investment in intangibles cause rising inequality.
To illuminate analytically the mechanism that this evidence points to, we need to un-
derstand the origins of the transition from stagnation to growth and how this transition
affects the evolution of the income distribution. In this study we develop a growth-theoretic
framework that enables us to characterize analytically the endogenous takeoff of an economy
and the evolution of the income distribution from stagnation to growth.
The framework builds on two branches of growth economics. The first is Unified Growth
Theory (Galor and Weil 2000, Galor 2005 and 2011), developed to explain the transition
from Malthusian stagnation to modern growth. The second is the theory of endogenous
technological change (Romer 1990), developed to formalize the idea that innovation is the key
driver of economic growth. Exploiting ideas from both branches, Peretto (2015) extends the
Schumpeterian growth model to allow for endogenous takeoff. We incorporate in his model
the approach to heterogeneous households in Chu and Cozzi (2018), to obtain a structure
that allows us to characterize analytically the endogenous takeoff of the economy and its
transition dynamics from stagnation to growth. The goal is to understand the evolution
of the personal distribution of income throughout the process. The source of heterogeneity
across households is the unequal distribution of assets. Accordingly, our framework builds
on the literature, recently revived by Piketty (2014), that considers wealth inequality as the
root cause of income inequality. One advantage of our analysis is that we do not impose any
particular assumption on the wealth distribution except that it has well-defined moments.
This property, in turn, allows us to obtain analytical solutions for popular measures of
inequality, in particular the Gini coefficient.
Our first main finding is that the economy initially features a pre-industrial era, character-
ized by stagnation with very slow economic growth, in which income inequality is determined
by the unequal distribution of land ownership and remains stationary. When the size of the
market becomes sufficiently large due to population growth, the economy begins to experi-
ence innovation, and the rate of economic growth begins to rise gradually, until it converges
1Lindert (2000a, b) also finds a rise in income inequality in Britain in as early as the late 18th century.
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to the steady state. This growth acceleration, fueled by a rising rate of return to innovation,
causes income inequality to rise gradually, until it reaches a constant steady-state value. The
mechanism at the heart of these dynamics is that the relative importance of asset income
increases over time. The evidence supporting this interpretation is strong: Madsen (2017)
shows that asset returns are an important determinant of income inequality and, as stated
above, Madsen et al. (2021) carries out the most comprehensive study documenting the role
of investment in the intangibles that drive the asset-market valuation of firms.
We also calibrate the model to current data in the UK to perform a quantitative analysis.
Simulating the transitional paths of the output growth rate and the real interest rate, we find
that the increase in the simulated growth rate and the simulated interest rate is consistent
with historical data in the UK. We simulate the transitional path of income inequality and
find that it increases sharply when the takeoff occurs. When the economy reaches the steady
state, income inequality is almost twice as high as the level prior to the takeoff, and the
steady-state level of income inequality is in line with the Gini coefficient of income in the
UK in recent time.
We obtain the result discussed above in a baseline model with inelastic labor supply. The
model has three main strengths: (i) it is analytically tractable; (ii) it identifies sharply the
role of growth accelerations as a main driver of rising income inequality; (iii) it measures
inequality with a well understood and widely used summary statistic of the shape of the
distribution of income. The model, on the other hand, has one main weakness: inequal-
ity plays no role in shaping the transition from stagnation to growth. We thus extend the
analysis allowing for labor income inequality due to endogenous labor supply. We find that
endogenous labor supply introduces a channel through which inequality contributes to shap-
ing the transition path of the economy, while it preserves the features (i)-(iii) that makes
the baseline model so useful. Specifically, labor income inequality consists of two margins:
an extensive margin along which households sort themselves into a leisure class that sup-
ply zero labor and the rest of society that supplies labor; an intensive margin along which
households supply labor as a decreasing function of their consumption share, which in turn
is an increasing function of their wealth share. The leisure class consists of households that
are wealthy enough to find optimal to forgo labor income. Our model, therefore, generates
endogenously the two-class structure–workers vs. capitalists–that is widely used in the
literature on inequality that builds on the classical theory of the distribution of income.
Models in this tradition, however, are often silent about the shape of the cross-sectional dis-
tribution of income because the imposed within-class homogeneity reduces the cross section
of the whole population to two degenerate distributions. Consequently, work that uses this
approach tends to measure inequality with grand ratios like the wealth share of GDP (see,
e.g., Madsen et al. 2021 discussed above). Our structure, in contrast, allows for heterogene-
ity in wealth, labor supply, and thus overall income, within each class. One of our results is
that a simple summary statistic of labor supply heterogeneity captures the channel through
which inequality affects aggregate outcomes.
This study relates to the vast literature on innovation and economic growth. The seminal
contribution by Romer (1990) features the invention of new products (i.e., horizontal inno-
vation) as the engine of growth. Aghion and Howitt (1992) develop the creative-destruction
Schumpeterian model in which economic growth is driven by the development of higher-
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quality products (i.e., vertical innovation) that displace existing products.2 Subsequent
studies, such as Smulders (1994), Smulders and van de Klundert (1995), Peretto (1994, 1998,
1999) and Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), combine vertical in-house innovation by incum-
bent firms and horizontal innovation by entrant firms to develop the class of Schumpeterian
creative-accumulation models with endogenous market structure.3 This study contributes to
this literature by introducing heterogeneous households in a tractable creative-accumulation
model that features an endogenous takeoff. The goal is to explore the effects of innovation on
the evolution of income inequality during the historical transition from stagnation to growth.
This study also relates to the literature on inequality and economic growth. The study
most directly related to our work is Madsen et al. (2021) discussed above. It uses a first-
generation Schumpeterian model to set up an empirical exercise guided by theory, although
it restricts attention to the model’s steady state. We differ chiefly in that we use a Schum-
peterian model with endogenous market structure, and use our model’s non-linear transi-
tional dynamics with phase transitions to go after analytical results on the historical rela-
tionship between growth and inequality.
Early studies in this literature explore how inequality affects economic growth via cap-
ital accumulation; see for example Galor and Zeira (1993) and Aghion and Bolton (1997).
Galor and Moav (2004) shows that in the early (late) stage of development, in which the
accumulation of physical (human) capital is the main engine of growth, inequality stimulates
(stifles) economic growth. Subsequent studies consider how inequality affects the demand
and supply of resources for innovation in the Romer (1990) model; see for example, Chou
and Talmain (1996), Zweimuller (2000), Foellmi and Zweimuller (2006) and Garcia-Penalosa
and Wen (2008). Recent studies by Jones and Kim (2018) and Aghion et al. (2019) focus on
the relationship between innovation and top-income inequality in the first-generation Schum-
peterian model.4 This study differs from these contributions by considering a Schumpeterian
model with endogenous takeoff and analyzing the historical evolution of income inequality
from stagnation to growth. The recent study by Madsen and Strulik (2020) also explores the
evolution of income inequality, measured as the ratio of land rents to wages, from stagnation
to growth arising from land-biased technological change driven by education. We, instead,
consider other measures of income inequality, such as the Gini coefficient and the top income
share, in a Schumpeterian, innovation-driven growth model.
Finally, this study relates to the literature on the Industrial Revolution and the transition
to modern economic growth. As mentioned, Unified Growth Theory (Galor and Weil 2000,
Galor 2005 and 2011) explores how the quality-quantity trade-off in child-rearing and the as-
sociated process of human capital accumulation allow an economy to escape the Malthusian
trap and experience economic growth.5 Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009) explore how the
inequality of land ownership in the pre-industrial era affects the transition of an economy
to the industrial era via the emergence of human-capital promoting institutions. Although
2See also Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom et al. (1990).
3Laincz and Peretto (2006), Ha and Howitt (2007), Madsen (2008, 2010) and Ang and Madsen (2011)
provide supportive empirical evidence for this broad class of Schumpeterian models.
4Other studies, such as Chu (2010), Chu and Cozzi (2018) and Chu et al. (2019, 2021), analyze the effects
of patent policy and monetary policy on innovation and income inequality.
5See Galor and Moav (2002), Galor and Mountford (2008) and Ashraf and Galor (2011) for other studies
and empirical evidence that supports Unified Growth Theory.
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the Schumpeterian model in Peretto (2015) features exogenous population growth and does
not feature human capital accumulation, the innovation-driven takeoff in the model captures
the Industrial Revolution, which is arguably the most important economic takeoff in human
history.6 Furthermore, this tractable growth-theoretic framework allows us to study analyti-
cally how innovation affects the rate of return on assets, and thereby the evolution of income
inequality, when we incorporate heterogeneous households in the model.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
analyzes the dynamics and derives the evolution of income inequality. Section 4 performs a
quantitative analysis. Section 5 considers labor income inequality due to endogenous labor
supply. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Schumpeterian growth model with heterogeneous
households and endogenous takeoff
We introduce heterogeneous households as in Chu (2010) and Chu and Cozzi (2018) to
the Schumpeterian model of endogenous takeoff in Peretto (2015). Our analysis provides a
complete closed-form solution for economic growth and income inequality from stagnation
to takeoff and eventually to the balanced growth path.
2.1 Heterogeneous households






e−ρt ln ct(h)dt, (1)
where ρ > 0 is the subjective discount rate and ct(h) is household consumption of the final
good.7 The household maximizes (1) subject to
ȧt(h) = rtat(h) + wtLt − ct(h), (2)
where at(h) is household wealth and rt is the real interest rate. The household supplies Lt
units of labor inelastically to earn wage income wtLt. The household’s labor endowment (the
mass of identical household members) grows at rate λ > 0, i.e., Lt = L (0) e
λt, L (0) = 1.
Standard dynamic optimization yields the familiar Euler equation
ċt(h)
ct(h)
= rt − ρ,
6Mokyr (2016) argues that innovations in Europe gave rise to the Industrial Revolution and sustained
economic growth that subsequently spread across the world.
7For simplicity, we assume that flow utility is a function of the household’s total consumption, rather than
the mass of identical household members multiplied by the utility of consumption per household member.
This allows us to abstract from differentiating between household-level consumption and individual-level
consumption given that the distinction is not important to our research question.
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A property of this saving rule that is quite important for our research question is that, due
to the homothetic preferences (1), the welfare-maximizing growth rate of consumption is the










ct(h)dh is aggregate consumption.
2.2 Final good
A competitive representative firm produces a final good Gt that can be consumed, used to
produce intermediate goods, invested in the improvement of the quality of existing interme-
diate goods, or invested in the creation of new intermediate goods. The final good is the














where {θ, α, γ} ∈ (0, 1). Nt is the mass of non-durable intermediate goods, whereas Lt(i)
and Rt are, respectively, services of labor and land. The index i on labor says that the
technology features full dilution of labor across intermediate goods, reflecting the property
that both labor and intermediate goods are rival inputs. Land, instead is non-rival across
intermediate goods and labor. Quality, is the good’s ability to raise the productivity of
the other physical factors. The contribution of good i to factor productivity downstream





Let pt (i) be the price of good i and qt be the rental price of land. Profit maximization
































Moreover, the final producer pays total compensation to, respectively, suppliers of interme-
diate goods, labor and land: ∫ Nt
0
pt (i)Xt (i) di = θGt; (8)
∫ Nt
0
wtLt (i) di = γ (1− θ)Gt; (9)
qtRt = (1− γ) (1− θ)Gt. (10)
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2.3 Intermediate goods and in-house R&D
Monopolistic firm i produces with a technology that requires Xt (i) units of the final good
to produce Xt (i) units of good i at quality Zt (i). The firm also bears a fixed operating cost
φZαt (i)Z
1−α
t in units of the final good. The firm can allocate It (i) units of the final good to
accumulate firm-specific knowledge according to the technology
Żt (i) = It (i) . (11)
The firm’s gross profit (i.e., profit before-R&D) is

















[Πs (i)− Is (i)] ds. (13)
The firm maximizes (13) subject to (7) and (11). We solve this problem in the appendix;
here we discuss only the elements needed to address the paper’s research question.
The demand curve (7) says that an unconstrained monopolist would charge pt (i) =
1/θ. However, we assume that competitive fringe firms can produce good i at the same
quality Zt(i) as the monopolist but at the higher marginal cost µ ∈ (1, 1/θ).
8 The value-
maximization problem then says that the monopolistic firm sets
pt(i) = min {µ, 1/θ} = µ (14)
to price fringe firms out of the market. The problem also delivers the firm’s rate of return
to quality innovation,













which is linear in quality-adjusted firm size xt (i) ≡ Xt (i) /Zt (i). This property is at the
heart of the mechanism that we study: incentives to innovate depend on quality-adjusted
firm size, which in turn depends on the size of the market.
In models of this class the equilibrium of the market for intermediate goods is symmetric:
firms start with the same initial knowledge Z0 (i) = Z0 for i ∈ [0, N0] and, facing a symmet-
ric environment, make identical decisions. Consequently, they grow at the same rate and













This variable compresses the three variables Lt (labor input), Rt (land input) and Nt (mass
of firms) into a single variable and thus makes the analysis of the model’s dynamics very
simple. For brevity, henceforth, we refer to xt as "firm size". With this notation, the rate of




= α [(µ− 1) xt − φ] . (16)
8Specifically, we allow for diffusion of knowledge from monopolistic firms to fringe firms that enables the
latter to constrain the pricing behavior of the former. This characterization disentangles markups from the
technological parameter θ that in this model is a key driver of the functional distribution of income.
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2.4 Entrants
A new firm pays βXt, β > 0, units of the final good to develop a new intermediate good of
average quality, Zt, set up operations and enter the market.
9 This structure preserves the
symmetry of the equilibrium of the intermediate goods market at all times. The asset-pricing








Entry is positive when the free-entry condition holds, i.e., when
Vt = βXt. (18)
Substituting (7) and (14) in (12) and then using the resulting expression, (11), (15), (17)













where zt ≡ Żt/Zt is the growth rate of average quality.
2.5 Value of land
Let vt denote the value of a unit of land. The asset-pricing equation for vt is rtvt = qt + v̇t.
This equation states that the return on land is determined by the rental price of land and
the capital gain in land value.
2.6 General equilibrium
The general equilibrium of this economy is a time path of allocations {At, Ct, Gt, Lt, Rt, Xt(i), It(i)}
and a time path of prices {rt, wt, qt, vt, pt(i), Vt (i)} such that:
• households maximize utility taking {rt, wt, qt} as given;
• final-good firms maximize profit taking {pt(i), wt, qt} as given;
• intermediate-good firms choose {pt(i), It(i)} to maximize Vt(i) taking rt as given;
• entrants make entry decisions anticipating that when in operation they will maximize
their value, i.e., they will behave as the incumbents in the previous bullet point;
• aggregate household wealth is the sum of the value of land and of the aggregate value
of monopolistic firms, At ≡
∫ 1
0
at(h)dh = vtR + VtNt;
9Peretto and Connolly (2007) discuss alternative specifications of entry costs that yield the same qualita-
tive results. They also show that the cost of entry scaling with market size prevents the cost from vanishing
in the presence of population growth. An empirical study by Bollard et al. (2016) documents that entry
costs do rise with the level of development, providing empirical support for our theoretical specification.
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• the labor market clears,
∫ Nt
0
Lt(i)di = NtLt(i) = Lt;
• the market for the final good clears.
2.7 Aggregation










= (1− γ)nt + zt + γλ. (21)
This growth rate has three components: (i) the growth rate of the variety of intermediate
goods, nt ≡ Ṅt/Nt; (ii) the growth rate of the average quality of intermediate goods, zt; (iii)
the growth rate of the labor force λ multiplied by the labor elasticity of final output γ.
3 Dynamics
This section analyzes the dynamics of the model. See Section 3.1 for the dynamics of the
aggregate economy. See Section 3.2 for the dynamics of the wealth distribution. See Section
3.3 for the dynamics of the income distribution. Section 3.4 provides a discussion on income
inequality.
3.1 Dynamics of the aggregate economy
The model identifies two eras: the pre-industrial era, where no innovation of any kind takes
place, and the industrial era, where variety innovation takes place because the free-entry
condition holds with equality. The industrial era consists of two phases: in phase 1, only
horizontal innovation occurs; in phase 2, quality innovation also occurs.10
In the pre-industrial era, the demand for each intermediate product is initially so small
(i.e., x0 < φ/(µ−1)) that a would-be monopolist operating the increasing-returns technology
would earn negative profit. Thus, the existing N0 intermediate goods are produced by
competitive firms that do not innovate, make zero profit at the price pt(i) = µ, and have zero
stock-market value. Anticipating this, agents are not willing to pay the sunk entry cost and
there is no variety innovation. Initially, therefore, all technologies exhibit constant returns
to scale and the demand for each intermediate product grows only because of exogenous
population growth. Eventually, the size of the market for intermediate goods is sufficiently
10See Bouscasse et al. (2021) for recent evidence that the historical pattern consists of a secular acceleration
of economic growth that can be divided in two well-identified phases. There is some debate in the literature
about the precise timing of the key events, but there is remarkable agreement on the overall time-profile of
the process.
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large that a would-be monopolist operating the increasing-returns technology could earn a
positive profit. We assume, however, that only innovation, in this case a process innovation,
allows a new firm to monopolize an existing market. The pre-industrial era, therefore, ends
only when the present value of monopolistic firms is sufficiently large that the free-entry
condition (18) holds.
We summarize the first important result governing the model’s dynamics in the following
proposition, which states that two key grand ratios are always constant.











1− θ nt = 0
1− θ + ρβθ/µ nt > 0
,
where nt = 0 identifies the pre-industrial era (the free-entry condition does not hold) and nt >



















Proof. See the Appendix.
The result that the consumption-output ratio is always constant implies that at all times













γλ nt = 0
γλ+ (1− γ)nt nt > 0 and zt = 0
γλ+ (1− γ)nt + zt nt > 0 and zt > 0
.
To translate this characterization of the general equilibrium of the model into a state-space
representation, in the appendix we construct the rates of variety growth (entry) nt and of
quality growth zt as two functions of the state variable xt that account for the non-negativity
















xN < xt ≤ xZ
α [(µ− 1) xt − φ]− ρ xt > xZ
, (22)
where, xN and xZ are the firm-size activation thresholds of, respectively, variety and quality
innovation. (The expressions for these objects as functions of the deep parameters are in the
Appendix.) This piecewise function says that in each phase, growth accelerates because one
form of Schumpeterian innovation starts occurring. Proposition 1, moreover, says that the
consumption-output ratio jumps up when the first phase transition occurs because this event
10
entails the costly creation of a new form of wealth–equity shares in monopolistic firms that
accumulate intangible capital–that make households richer. The individual and aggregate
effects of this wealth creation event depend on how the newly issued shares are distributed
across the heterogeneous households (more on this below).
The function n (xt) constructed in the appendix yields the equilibrium law of motion of
the state variable xt. We summarize the property as follows.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Dynamics) Assume
ρ+ λ < min {(1− α)φ, (1− α)(µ− 1)/β} .
The key properties of the model’s dynamics are as follows. (i) The state variable xt obeys
























xt xt > xZ
.
(ii) There exists a unique, scale-invariant, steady state
x∗ =
(1− α)φ− (ρ+ λ)
(1− α)(µ− 1)− β(ρ+ λ)
> xZ . (23)
(iii) Given initial condition x0 ∈ (0, xN), the dynamics are globally stable and xt converges
to the steady state x∗. (iv) The steady state exhibits the scale-invariant growth rate
g∗ = α [(µ− 1) x∗ − φ]− ρ > 0. (24)
Proof. See the Appendix.
We illustrate the dynamics described by Proposition 2 in two figures. Figure 1 shows
that firm size xt grows throughout the transition, following an S-shaped (i.e., logistic) path,
where TN and TZ are the activation dates of, respectively, variety and quality innovation.
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so that the mass of products/firms grows at the rate λ; see Laincz and Peretto (2006), among
many others, for empirical evidence that Nt is proportional to Lt in advanced economies.
11The model yields analytical solutions for these dates; see the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Transition path of the firm size
Figure 2 shows the dynamics of economic growth that we obtain by feeding the path of
xt to the growth rate equation (22). In the pre-industrial era, the growth rate of output
is simply gt = γλ due to the absence of innovation. In the industrial era, the growth rate
accelerates, initially fueled only by variety innovation and then also by quality innovation.
As xt converges to x
∗, the growth rate converges to the steady-state value g∗ in (24).
Figure 2: Transition path of the growth rate
This gradual acceleration of economic growth is consistent with historical data for the
12
UK. Figure 3 plots the log of the UK real GDP from 1700 to 2016.12 The slope of the plot is
the growth rate. According to the data, the average growth rate in the UK is 0.71% in the
first half of the 18th century, 1.24% in the second half of the 18th century, 1.86% in the first
half of the 19th century, 2.23% in the second half of the 19th century, 1.50% in the first half
of the 20th century and 2.55% from the second half of the 20th century onwards. Except
for the wartime periods in the first half of the 20th century, the UK experiences a gradually
rising growth rate as in our Schumpeterian model of endogenous takeoff. We are interested
in the implications of these dynamics for inequality.
Figure 3: Log of real GDP in the UK from 1700 to 2016
3.2 Dynamics of the wealth distribution
Let sc,t(h) ≡ ct(h)/Ct and sa,t(h) ≡ at(h)/At be, respectively, the share of consumption and
of wealth of household h at time t.13 The most important implication of the saving behavior
characterized by equation (3) is that households want to achieve the same consumption
growth rate, since they face the common interest rate r and they have the same discount
rate ρ. It follows that the household consumption share sc,t (h) is always constant. The
aggregate transition dynamics, however, suggest that the consumption share is phase specific.
Moreover, in general equilibrium the household’s consumption-saving behavior yields that
the wealth share is also always constant and phase specific.
The following proposition summarizes our main formal result on the dynamics of the
household consumption and wealth shares.
12Data source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
13Note that we do not treat the household’s land holding Rt (h) as a constant but, consistently with how
we wrote the budget constraint (2), we treat it as an asset that the household can trade at price vt.
13
Proposition 3 (Household Shares) Consider household h for h ∈ [0, 1]. Let sR,0 (h) ≥ 0
be the household’s land share at time t = 0 and let sa,TN (h) be the household’s wealth share
at time t = TN . Define also the composite parameter Θ ≡ βθ/(1 − θ). In equilibrium, the
household’s consumption and wealth shares are, respectively:




sR,0 (h) 0 ≤ xt ≤ xN
sa,TN (h) xt > xN
;









sa,TN (h) xt > xN
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The proposition says that agents have perfect foresight and incorporate in their decisions
all available information at t = 0. Consequently, the consumption share must jump at t = 0.
The implication for the dynamics of the shares is twofold. First, even though our scheme
allows for trade of land, in equilibrium households do not trade it and sR,t (h) = sR,0 (h) for
all t ∈ [0, TN ]. Second, both shares are constant at all t 6= TN , with a discrete adjustment
of the consumption share at t = TN that gives the optimal intertemporal response to the
arrival of new wealth. Note that to complete the second argument we need to take a stand
on the distribution of industrial wealth at t = TN . To get started, we assume that it tracks
the distribution of land. Thus, sa,TN (h) = R0(h)/R ≡ sR(h). Alternative assumptions on
the initial distribution of industrial wealth are feasible but do not change the qualitative
results of our analysis.
The following narrative describing the dynamics of the wealth distribution emerges from
this characterization. In the pre-industrial era the distribution of wealth is stationary and
determined by the initial (exogenous) distribution of land. When the economy enters the
industrial era, a new form of wealth appears–equity shares in industrial firms that develop
and apply new technology. We find that the distribution of wealth, now consisting of both
land and industrial shares, continues to be stationary and jointly determined by the distrib-
ution of land and by the initial distribution of industrial shares at the time of the takeoff. To
simplify we assume that such initial distribution tracks the distribution of land.14 It is im-
portant to note that the economy features transition dynamics determined by the evolution
of firm size. However, despite these dynamics the wealth distribution remains stationary
because we work with a structure where households want parallel log-consumption paths.
Since this implies constant consumption shares and households face a common rate of return
to assets, it follows that the household wealth shares must be constant as well.
To close this subsection, we sort households in ascending order of wealth and define the
Gini coefficient of wealth at time t,




14According to Clark (2008), the landed aristocracy and their descendants were still among the wealthiest
group at least by the 1860s.
14























In light of Proposition 3, the Gini coefficient of wealth is stationary. Moreover, we have
σa,t = σa,0 = σR for all t, where σR is the Gini coefficient of land ownership at time 0. The
model produces any other summary statistics that we might wish to consider; for example,








We focus on the Gini coefficient because of its prominent role in the literature.
3.3 Dynamics of the income distribution




yt(h)dh = rtAt + wtLt.
Note that Yt is not Gt because in this model there are intermediate goods. Specifically, Yt
is GDP, while Gt is aggregate production of the final good.
Let sy,t(h) ≡ yt(h)/Yt denote the income share of household h and sL,t ≡ wLt/Yt be the




= (1− sL,t) sR(h) + sL,t, (25)
where we have used sa,t(h) = sR(h). This equation says that the household’s income share
has two determinants: the household’s land share sR(h) and the aggregate labor share sL,t.
An increase in the aggregate labor share raises the income share of household h if the
household’s wealth share sR(h) is less than one (the average wealth share), it lowers it if the
reverse is true. This simple property constitutes the main transmission channel of macro
events to household income and thus to the cross-sectional distribution of income.
Equation (25) allows us to derive any summary statistic of the income distribution. The
Gini coefficient of income is15
σy,t = (1− sL,t) σR. (26)
This expression says that income inequality is decreasing in the labor share. Accounting for




















σR xt > xN
. (27)
15The coefficient of variation of income is still given by σy,t = (1− sL)σR if we instead define σy,t ≡√∫ 1
0
[sy,t(h)− 1]2dh and σR ≡
√∫ 1
0
[sR(h)− 1]2dh as the coefficients of variation of income and wealth.
15




sy,t(h)dh = (1− sL,t)S
ε
a,t + sL,tε.








This expression says that the top ε income share is increasing in the ratio of the Gini indices
σy,t/σR if and only if S
ε
a,t > ε. In other words, a rising Gini coefficient of income does not
necessarily yield a rising top ε income share. The condition for this to happen is that the
share of wealth of the top ε household be larger than ε. This condition clearly holds in the
data since wealth is highly concentrated.
We summarize our result on the evolution of income inequality as follows. In the pre-
industrial era, income inequality is a constant multiple of land ownership inequality. At
the beginning of the industrial era, income inequality jumps up because of the unequal
distribution of industrial wealth that we assume tracks the distribution of land. Thereafter
income inequality is a multiple of land inequality, with a multiplier that is an increasing
function of the growth rate gt, whose dynamics are described by (22). In phase 1 the growth
rate is fueled only by variety innovation and rises gradually. Eventually, phase 2 starts and
quality innovation adds its contribution, providing a new acceleration of the growth rate
with final convergence to the steady state g∗ described in (24). Figure 4 summarizes the
dynamics of the Gini index σy,t from stagnation to takeoff and eventually to the steady state.
Figure 4: Transition path of income inequality
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3.4 Discussion and interpretation
To extract the key insight provided by the model’s dynamics, we ask why the labor share is
decreasing in the growth rate of final output gt. We note first that the consumption-output
ratio is always constant, see Proposition 1, and thus the Euler equation (3) yields rt = ρ+gt.
We then split wealth in its two separate components–land vtRt (h) and industrial shares
aNt (h)–and write the household budget (2) as
ȧNt (h) + v̇tRt (h) + vtṘt (h) = rta
N
t (h) + rtvtRt (h) + wtLt − ct(h).
Aggregating and noting that the land market clears,
∫ 1
0
Rt(h)dh = R, we obtain
ȦNt + v̇tR = rtA
N






rtANt + rtvtR + wtLt
=
wtLt
(ρ+ gt) (ANt + vtR) + wtLt
.
It thus seems that all else equal the labor share is decreasing in the growth rate simply because
the real interest rate is increasing in it. However, and more interestingly, the equation says
that the labor share is decreasing in the growth rate because faster growth raises the real
interest rate and thereby raises aggregate income via the asset income channel. This is not
a variant of the now popular r > g story (see, e.g., Piketty 2014): here the labor share does
not fall over time because the real interest rate is higher than the growth rate, it falls over
time because the growth rate accelerates throughout the industrial era. Indeed, when the
growth rate is constant, as in the pre-industrial era and in the steady state of the industrial
era, the labor share is constant. As discussed, Madsen et al. (2021) provide the most recent
and comprehensive evidence supporting this mechanism.
To see the mechanism in finer detail note that in the pre-industrial era gt = γλ, a






















The model’s mechanism, therefore, is that inequality is initially constant and then rises along
the transition because the growth acceleration that takes place throughout the industrial era,
which is a manifestation of the rising rate of return to innovation, causes asset income to
rise faster than wage income. This differential growth propagates through the households,
continuously spreading out the distribution of their incomes because of the heterogeneity in
their assets holdings. This dynamic mechanism emphasizes the property mentioned above
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that in this model wealth inequality is the root cause of income inequality. This is consistent
with the thrust of the recent literature based on Piketty (2014), which sees fundamental
differences across households in their sources of income–capital vs. labor–as the root
cause of income inequality. Our main mechanism differs in that the dynamics of income
inequality are driven by growth accelerations, not by the mere fact that the interest rate is
larger than the growth rate.
To summarize, in this model the income distribution is non-degenerate, endogenous,
and non-stationary but analytically tractable. The dynamics produce a clear insight: the
secular acceleration of the growth rate in the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution produced
a secular rise of income inequality because asset income grew faster than labor income.
The tractability of the model is predicated on the property that the wealth distribution is
stationary. This property follows from the assumption that our households have identical
homothetic preferences over consumption and thus want parallel log-consumption paths with
intercepts that differ because of the unequal distribution of land. Admittedly, this feature
makes the model silent on the evolution of the wealth distribution. We offer in its defense
three arguments. First, our wealth distribution is stationary, not exogenous. That is, the
only thing that we take as exogenous to the model is the initial distribution of land. Once the
industrial era begins, we have a mechanism that produces endogenously a new stationary
distribution of wealth. Second, there is evidence that wealth inequality evolves around a
stationary value in the very long run.16 Thus, working with a model that treats the stationary
distribution of wealth as the root cause of income inequality is not only interesting and fruitful
but also empirically legitimate. Third, models of heterogeneous agents that produce a fully
endogenous wealth distribution tend to be so complex that more often than not one is forced
to impose stationarity anyway. Since our goal is to study the secular dynamics of income
inequality, such an approach is not useful. In contrast, our approach is so tractable that
we obtain a complete analytical characterization of the dynamics of economic growth and a
complete analytical characterization of the distribution of income at any point in time.
4 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to UK data in order to perform a quantitative analysis.
The model features the following parameters: {ρ, α, λ, θ, β, γ, µ, φ}. We set the discount rate
ρ to 0.04. We follow Iacopetta et al. (2019) to set the degree of technology spillovers 1−α to
0.833. In the UK, the long-run population growth rate λ is 0.6%.17 Then, we calibrate the
remaining parameters {θ, β, γ, µ, φ} by matching the following moments for the UK economy:
52.6% for labor income as a share of output,18 74.4% for consumption as a share of output,19
12.3% for housing rents as a share of output,20 2.5% for the growth rate of output,21 and
16Madsen (2019) provides evidence that wealth inequality remains at a stationary value in the long run
with short-run deviations that can last over decades. We are essentially treating these short-run deviations
as exogenous.
17Data source: Maddison Project Database.
18Data source: Office for National Statistics.
19Data source: Office for National Statistics.
20Data source: New Economics Foundation.
21Data source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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18.4% for investment as a share of output.22 Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameter
values.23 These parameter values imply a rate of asset returns of 6.5% and R&D as a share
of output of 2.0%, which are in line with UK data.
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
ρ α λ θ β γ µ φ
0.040 0.167 0.006 0.351 14.468 0.810 2.138 0.245
Figure 5 presents the simulated paths of the output growth rate and the real interest
rate along with the HP-filter trends of the GDP growth rate and the rate of return on non-
residential fixed capital in the UK.24 We choose an initial value x0 such that the takeoff
occurs in the late 18th century.25 This figure shows that the output growth rate increases
from about 0.5% in the late 18th century to 2.5% in recent time. This gradual increase in
the growth rate and the magnitude of the increase are in line with historical data in the UK.
Figure 5 also shows that the real interest rate increases from 4.5% in the late 18th century to
an average of 5.9% in the 19th century and reaches an average of 6.4% in the 20th century.
The average rates of return on non-residential fixed capital in the UK were 5.1% in the 18th
century, 6.0% in the 19th century, and 7.0% from the 20th century onwards.26 Therefore,
the increase in the rate of return on assets and the magnitude of the increase in asset returns
predicted by our model are also in line with historical data.
Figure 5: Simulated paths of the growth rate and the interest rate
22Data source: Office for National Statistics. To compute this moment from the model, we add up expenses
on intermediate goods and horizontal/vertical R&D. One can think of the intermediate goods in our model
as investment in capital that depreciates rapidly.
23The calibrated value of µ seems high but implies a reasonable profit share of output of 11.5%.
24Here we use a smoothing parameter of 1000 on the annual data in order to extract a smoother trend.
25According to Ashton (1998), the Industrial Revolution started in as early as 1760.
26See Madsen (2017). The authors are grateful to Jakob Madsen for sharing this data series.
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The increase in the real interest rate in Figure 5 implies an increase in income inequality
in our model. Figure 6 presents the simulated path of income inequality in terms of percent
changes from its initial value prior to the takeoff. This figure shows that income inequality
increases sharply by about 50% when the takeoff occurs. When the economy reaches the
balanced growth path, income inequality would have almost doubled. Our model takes the
degree of wealth inequality as given. If we consider a Gini coefficient of wealth of 0.732 in
recent time,27 then we can also simulate the Gini coefficient of income. Figure 7 reports the
simulated path of income inequality along with the Gini coefficient of income in the UK from
1961 to 2017.28 It shows that the simulated Gini coefficient of income increases from 0.15
before the takeoff to 0.29 in the steady state.
Figure 6: Simulated path of income inequality (percent change)
27Data source: Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook.
28Data source: Institute for Fiscal Studies. Data available from 1961.
20
Figure 7: Simulated path of income inequality (Gini coefficient)
Williamson (1980, 1985) and Lindert (2000a, 2000b) examine historical data in Britain
and document that income inequality, based on different measures, increases in the late
18th century/early 19th century and levels off after the mid-19th century. Then, income
inequality, measured by the top 1% income share, decreases from the early 20th century to
the late 1970’s.29 As for the Gini coefficient of income, it decreases from 0.27 in the early
1960’s to 0.24 in the late 1970’s before rising again to as high as 0.36 in recent time with an
average value of 0.30 from 1961 to 2017 in the UK. Therefore, the long-run level of income
inequality predicted by our model is in line with recent data in the UK. Furthermore, our
model is able to deliver the pattern of rising income inequality in the late 18th century/early
19th century and its leveling off in the late 19th century. However, our model is unable to
explain the decrease in income inequality from the early 20th century to the late 1970’s. The
reason is that this decrease in income equality is driven by a decrease in wealth inequality,30
whereas our model takes wealth inequality as given.
To address this issue, we consider historical data on the income and wealth shares owned
by the top households, which have longer time series than the Gini coefficient. Therefore,
we now use historical data on the top 10% wealth share in the UK along with the asset-wage
income ratio rtAt/(wtLt) computed from our model to simulate the top 10% income share.
Figure 8 presents the simulated path of the top 10% income share along with data in the
UK from 1900 to 2010.31 Given the data on wealth inequality, our model now predicts that
income inequality rises in the 19th century and falls from the early 20th century to the
1970’s. After that, income inequality becomes rising again. This pattern matches the data.
29World Inequality Database documents a decrease in the top 1% income share from 20% in the early 20th
century to 5% in the late 1970’s.
30World Inequality Database documents a decrease in the top 1% wealth share from 70% in the early 20th
century to less than 20% in the early 1980’s.
31Data source: Piketty (2014). Data on the top 10% wealth (income) share is available from 1810 (1900).
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Furthermore, the average value of the top 10% income share in the UK from 1900 to 2010 is
0.37, whereas our model predicts an average value of 0.36 in this period.
Figure 8: Simulated path of the top 10% income share
5 Labor income inequality
Our baseline model has three main strengths: (i) it is eminently tractable; (ii) it identifies
sharply the role of growth accelerations as a main driver of rising income inequality; (iii) it
measures inequality with a well understood and widely used summary statistic of the shape
of the distribution of income. The baseline model, on the other hand, has one main weakness:
inequality plays no role in shaping the transition from stagnation to growth. In this section,
we extend the analysis allowing for labor income inequality due to endogenous labor supply.
The advantage of doing this is twofold. First, endogenous labor supply is interesting per
se and including it makes the analysis more empirically relevant. Second, endogenous labor
supply introduces a channel through which inequality contributes to shaping the transition
path of the economy.
5.1 The model with endogenous labor supply














where lt(h) is the household’s labor supply and 1 − lt(h)/Lt is leisure per member of the
household. The parameter η > 0 determines the importance of leisure, whereas the para-
meter ω > 0 determines the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for leisure. The budget
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constraint is
ȧt(h) = rtat(h) + wtlt(h)− ct(h). (30)









The rest of the model is the same as before.
5.2 Special case: ω = 1
We begin our analysis with the special case ω = 1, which gives log-log utility. Aggregating






























We stress that because labor supply is linear in consumption, the heterogeneity across house-
holds washes out. Next, we use the labor demand (9), note that Proposition 1 holds in this





















































Since it depends on the consumption-output ratio, the employment ratio jumps when the
consumption ratio jumps.
The simplicity of this special case allows us to show immediately the implications of
endogenous labor supply for the model’s dynamics. To express the dynamics in terms of a
































The interpretation of xt is no longer firm size, but the mapping to that concept is transparent.
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− ρ xt > xZ
. (34)
In this extension as well the state variable xt grows from an initial value x0 and gradually
converges to the steady-state value x∗ following an S-shaped path. The value [(l/L)∗]γx∗ is
the same as x∗ in (23) in the baseline case due to the model’s scale-invariance property. The
growth rate gt is constant in the pre-industrial era and then gradually increases throughout
the industrial era, converging to the same value g∗ in (24) as in the baseline case due to
scale-invariance. Moreover, we show in the appendix that the differential equation governing
the dynamics of the household wealth share still yields the result that the wealth share is
constant at all times. To summarize, the dynamics of the economy are qualitatively the
same as those discussed in Propositions 2-3.
We now derive the implications of this structure for the income distribution. Since the
wealth share is constant, we rewrite the budget constraint (30) as ct(h) = (rt − gt)at(h) +




[wtLt − η(rt − gt)at(h)] .
This result says that, since rt > gt, wealthier households supply less labor and earn lower
labor income. Accounting for this labor income inequality, we show in the Appendix that






(rt + ηgt)At + wtLt
sR(h) +
wtLt
(rt + ηgt)At + wtLt
. (35)
We define the term
s̃L,t ≡
wtLt
(rt + ηgt)At + wtLt
=
sL,t
(1 + η) lt
Lt
(36)
and rewrite (35) as in the baseline case,
sy,t(h) = (1− s̃L,t) sR(h) + s̃L,t. (37)
Our extended result therefore is that the evolution of the household income share is de-
termined by the evolution of the ratio (rt + ηgt)At/(wtLt), rather than rtAt/(wtLt). The
additional term ηgtAt captures the effect on labor income of standard labor supply behavior.
The Gini coefficient of income is
σy,t = (1− s̃L,t) σR. (38)





















Substituting this expression in (38) yields an expression similar to (27), except for the addi-




ρ+ (1 + η)gt
ρ
(






ρ+ (1 + η)gt
ρ
[
1− γ + ρΘ/µ
γ + η(1 + ρΘ/µ)
]
.
Substituting this expression in (38) yields an expression similar to (27). In the industrial
era, income inequality σy,t gradually increases until gt converges to the same steady-state
value g∗ as in our baseline case.
We stress that in this structure the employment ratio lt/Lt is the only channel through
which the equilibrium of the labor market affects the economy’s dynamics. This property is
important to understand the transmission mechanism of the heterogeneity in labor income
that we discuss next.
5.3 General case: ω 6= 1
We now consider the general case ω 6= 1. With the preferences in (29) that yield labor
supply (31), we have two new properties: (i) the curvature of lt(h)/Lt with respect to the
consumption per capita-to-wage ratio, [ct (h) /Lt] /wt, yields that household heterogeneity in
labor supply, and therefore in labor income, matters for aggregate outcomes; (ii) household
behavior allows for lt(h)/Lt = 0 for some h. To make the exposition as clear as possible, we
focus first on property (i) and then discuss property (ii).
5.3.1 The role of labor income inequality
In this subsection we shut down property (ii), that is, we consider the case lt(h)/Lt > 0 for









































accounts for the heterogeneity in labor supply behavior, which in this specification does not




















are functions of the model’s parameters. The left-hand side is increasing; the right hand side































































As stated, we rule out the corner solution lt(h)/Lt = 0 so that all households work.
Since the employment ratio is always constant, in this case as well, and the case that
we study in the next subsection, the differential equation governing the dynamics of the
household wealth share yields that the wealth share is constant at all times. The formal
proof is identical to that developed in the previous subsection.
The presence of the operator ∆∗c in the solution (39) is our property (i), namely, equilib-
rium aggregate labor supply, and therefore equilibrium employment, depends on the hetero-
geneity across household in their individual labor supply. The question then is, what is ∆∗c ,
the term accounting for such heterogeneity? The answer is that ∆∗c is the power mean of
the consumption shares, where, because of the unit continuum of households, the consump-
tion share is also consumption relative to mean consumption. The parameter ω drives how
the operator "penalizes" or "rewards" the dispersion of consumption relative to the mean.
Specifically, for ω = 1 we have ∆∗c = 1 regardless of the dispersion of consumption relative
to the mean. For ω 6= 1, instead, ∆∗c deviates from unity unless s
∗
c(h) = 1 for all h ∈ [0, 1]
(i.e., a completely equal society). In particular, an unequal society has ∆∗c > 1 for ω > 1
and ∆∗c < 1 for ω < 1. Moreover, ∆
∗
c is increasing in consumption inequality for ω > 1 and
decreasing in it for ω < 1. Finally, given that the employment ratio lt/Lt is decreasing in
the dispersion index ∆∗c , the unequal society features higher employment than an equal one
under ω < 1 and lower employment under ω > 1. Similarly, the employment ratio lt/Lt is
increasing in consumption inequality under ω < 1 and decreasing under ω > 1.
To understand why the value of ω determines how inequality affects employment, we plot
(31) in Figure 9. This figure shows that when ω is greater (less) than 1, the decrease in labor
supply by rich households, which have above average consumption, is greater (less) than
the increase in labor supply by poor households, which have below average consumption;
as a result, inequality that gives rise to rich and poor households reduces (raises) aggregate
employment.
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Figure 9: Equation (31)
The use of power means of variables expressed in deviation from the mean as summary
statistics for inequality is quite common. In fact, our operator ∆∗c is related to well-known
measures of inequality widely discussed in the literature. Specifically, it is a transformation







ω] dh, ω 6= 0, 1.
Therefore,
∆∗c = [1− ω (1− ω) ·GE (ω)]
1
ω ,
where, for ω < 1, Aω = ω (1− ω) ·GE (ω) is the Atkinson index of inequality, a popular and
well understood measure. In other words, for ω < 1 our ∆∗c is proportional to A
1/ω
ω .
A simple example illuminates the mechanism. Let initial household wealth a0 (h) be a
draw from a Pareto II distribution with CDF







, a ≥ amin, κ > 0, ξ > 1,
where the location parameter amin is the lowest value of wealth. To allow for households with
zero wealth, we set amin = 0, which gives us the Lomax distribution.
32 The scale and shape
parameters, κ and ξ, have the standard interpretation popularized by the literature on Pareto
distributions of wealth and income.33 The CDF of the wealth share s∗a (h) = a0 (h) /A0 is







, κ > 0, ξ > 1.
32We do not use the popular Pareto I distribution because it requires sa > κ > 0 and thus does not allow
for zero-wealth households.
33The scale parameter, however, is ultimately linked to supply of assets. In the pre-industrial era, in
particular, we have κ/ (ξ − 1) = R so that we must set κ = R (ξ − 1).
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Note that this has mean 1 since A =
∫ 1
0


























Thus, as ξ rises, the distribution of wealth becomes more equal.
As stated in Proposition 3, which extends to this case of endogenous labor supply, the
consumption share s∗c (h) is a phase-specific linear function of the wealth share s
∗
a (h). To
minimize notation, we write s∗c (h) = ϕ0 + ϕ1s
∗
a (h), where the exact expressions for the
phase-specific coefficients are in the Appendix and by construction ϕ0 + ϕ1 = 1. Since we
are taking a linear transformation, the distribution of the consumption shares is Pareto II
with CDF








This too has the property that as ξ rises, it shifts up, i.e., the distribution of consumption
becomes more equal. Note that while the support of the wealth distribution is [0,∞), the
distribution of the consumption shares features a positive lower bound, ϕ0, which corresponds
to the consumption share of the zero-wealth households.34 We then have






Unfortunately, the calculation of E [(s∗c)
ω] for this class of distributions is complex and rarely
delivers easily interpretable closed-form solutions.
However, this analytical structure produces a clear insight. A society with more unequal
land ownership, i.e., a society with smaller shape parameter ξ of the Pareto II distribution
of land, has a more unequal Pareto II distribution of consumption and thus a more unequal
Pareto II distribution of labor supply. Such labor supply behavior yields lower employment
under ω > 1 and higher employment under ω < 1. This intratemporal causal chain traces
how wealth inequality propagates throughout the economy, affecting its scale of operation and
thereby its growth path. It also stresses the importance of the parameter ω that regulates
the responsiveness of labor supply to consumption. The intertemporal part of the causal
chain is that in our scale-invariant model the employment ratio determines the threshold xN
for our state variable, xt, and thus determines the overall shape of the transition path via
its effect on the timing of key events, even though it does not affect steady-state growth.
Specifically, the takeoff date is TN = ln(xN/x0)/λ, with xN = φ/[(µ− 1− βρ)(l/L)
γ] being
decreasing in the employment ratio l/L. Consequently, a more unequal society takes off
later under under ω > 1 and earlier under ω < 1. These differences in the timing of takeoff
never wash out, holding constant everything else. Thus, initial wealth inequality, which in
our scheme is the root of all inequality, has effects that echo for centuries and are amplified
by the growth acceleration that occurs with the takeoff.
34Note also that E [s∗c ] =
(ξ−1)ϕ
1
ξ−1 + ϕ0 = ϕ1 + ϕ0 = 1.
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5.3.2 Endogenous formation of the leisure class










≥ 1⇒ s∗c(h) ≥
wtLt
ηCt




















Next, we note that if we sort households over the unit interval in ascending order of con-
sumption share, the condition s∗c(h) ≥
wtLt
ηCt
defines the cutoff value











The model, therefore, generates endogenously a leisure class, i.e., households who do not
work and live off asset income, which consists of industrial dividends, land rents and capital
gains on the prices of industrial shares and land.
To construct the equilibrium we need to check how the individual household decision
depends on the aggregate state of the labor market. That is, we need to derive the equilibrium
expression for the wage by aggregating across households and then check how the individual









































































































that are functions of the model’s parameters. The left-hand side is increasing; the right hand





























































This expression identifies which households want to go to the corner solution.
In this characterization, the equilibrium of the labor market is the standard intersection
of labor demand and labor supply. What differs from the standard approach is that here
labor supply is the joint solution of two equations. The first says that labor supply is the




, the second determines the set
of such households. Consequently, the model allows for heterogeneity in labor supply over
two margins: the extensive margin, where the household determines whether to supply labor
or not; the intensive margin, where the household determines the fraction of time spent
working, conditional on having determined that the fraction is positive.
The operator ∆̄∗c plays the same role as the operator ∆
∗
c discussed in the previous case.
However, we must note that in the variable sc,t(h) = ct (h) /Ct the Ct at the denominator is



























































and note that the variable in the integral is household consumption relative to mean con-
sumption for the set of households that supply labor. We thus have the same interpretation
as before for the operator ∆̄∗c , with the refinement that it is the power mean of the consump-
tion relative to the mean of the households that supply labor, adjusted for the endogenous
two-classes structure of society, the term 1/h̄ that pushes it up due to the extensive margin









This study explored the historical evolution of income inequality from stagnation to growth
in a tractable Schumpeterian model with endogenous takeoff and heterogeneous households.
Our first result can be summarized as follows. In the pre-industrial era, the economy is in
stagnation and income inequality is determined solely by the unequal distribution of land
ownership and remains stationary. In the industrial era, the gradually rising growth rate
causes income inequality to increase over time until the economy reaches the steady state.
We calibrate the model to perform a quantitative analysis and find that the simulation results
are roughly in line with historical data for the UK.
The result above obtains in a baseline model with inelastic labor supply that has three
main strengths: (i) it is analytically tractable; (ii) it identifies sharply the role of growth
accelerations as a main driver of rising income inequality; (iii) it measures inequality with
a well understood and widely used summary statistic of the shape of a non-degenerate
distribution of income. The baseline model, however, says that inequality plays no role in
shaping the transition from stagnation to growth. To address this weakness, we extended the
analysis allowing for labor income inequality due to endogenous labor supply. The advantage
of doing this is twofold. First, the aggregate dynamics of our economy remain eminently
tractable and consist of the two-phase secular transition documented for the simple baseline
model with inelastic labor supply. Second, allowing for endogenous labor supply extends
considerably the scope of our analysis: inequality affects the employment ratio and thus,
through that standard role that scale plays in Schumpeterian models, contributes to shaping
the transition path of the economy. Specifically, inequality that results in higher employment
produces an earlier takeoff and a higher growth rate during the transition path. However,
as the equilibrium growth rate converges to the steady state, this effect disappears due to
the scale-invariance of our Schumpeterian growth model.
In this scheme, labor income inequality consists of two margins: an extensive margin
along which households sort themselves in a leisure class that supply zero labor and the rest
of society that supplies labor; an intensive margin along which households supply labor as
a decreasing function of their consumption share, which in turn is an increasing function of
their wealth share. The leisure class consists of households that are wealthy enough to find
optimal to forgo labor income. Because of this property our model generates endogenously
the two-class structure–workers vs. capitalists–that is widely used in the literature on
inequality that builds on the classical theory of the distribution of income. The practice
there is to postulate the two classes with fixed size and with homogeneity within each class.
The resulting models are then silent about the shape of the cross-sectional distribution of
income since the imposed within-class homogeneity reduces the cross section of the whole
population to two degenerate distributions. Consequently, work that uses this approach tends
to measure inequality with grand ratios like the wealth share of GDP (see, e.g., Madsen et
al. 2021, which we discussed in detail). Our structure, in contrast, allows for heterogeneity
in wealth, labor supply, and thus overall income, within each class.
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A Appendix
Rate of return to quality innovation. The current-value Hamiltonian of firm i is
Ht (i) = Πt (i)− It (i) + ηt (i) Żt (i) + ξt (i) [µ− pt (i)] ,
where ηt (i) is the co-state variable on (11) and ξt (i) is the multiplier on pt (i) ≤ µ. Substi-






= ξt (i) ; (A.1)
∂Ht (i)
∂It (i)















= rtηt (i)− η̇t (i) . (A.3)
If pt (i) < µ, then ξt (i) = 0; in this case, ∂Πt (i) /∂pt (i) = 0 yields pt (i) = 1/θ. If the
constraint on pt (i) is binding, then ξt (i) > 0; in this case, pt (i) = µ. Given µ < 1/θ, we
have pt (i) = µ. We use (A.2), (15) and pt (i) = µ in (A.3) and impose symmetry for (16).
Proof of Proposition 1. Aggregation of the budget constraints of the heterogeneous
households yields
Ȧt = rtAt + wtLt − Ct. (A.4)
As a result of the market structure described above, wealth in the pre-industrial era consists
only of land, i.e., At = Rvt, and (A.4) reduces to
Rv̇t = (qt + v̇t)R + wtLt − Ct ⇒ Ct = qtR + wtLt,
which says that in this era consumption equals income, the sum of land income and labor


































This unstable differential equation says that to satisfy the households’ transversality condi-





















In contrast, in the industrial era the free-entry condition (18) holds, the value of monopolistic




Ġt = (qt + v̇t)R + rt
βθ
µ
Gt + wtLt − Ct.















This unstable differential equation says that to satisfy the households’ transversality condi-









= 1− θ + ρβθ/µ.
Proceeding as in the previous case, we obtain that the consumption-wealth ratio, Ct/At,

















ρ (1− θ + ρβθ/µ)
(1− γ) (1− θ) + ρβθ/µ
.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given xt = (θ/µ)
1/(1−θ) (Lt/Nt)




= γ(λ− nt). (A.5)
In the pre-industrial era, the variety growth rate nt is zero; in this case, the dynamics of xt
is simply given by ẋt = γλxt.










which is obtained by substituting (21), (A.5) and rt = ρ + gt into (19). In this era, the
quality growth rate zt is zero, so the variety growth rate nt is positive if and only if xt >
φ/(µ − 1 − βρ) ≡ xN , where xN is a threshold for the firm size xt above which variety
innovation starts to occur at time TN = ln(xN/x0)/λ. Equation (A.6) shows that when
xt > xN , variety innovation occurs (i.e., nt > 0); in this case, we substitute (A.6) into (A.5)
to derive the dynamics of xt in the first industrial era.
In the second industrial era (xt > xZ > xN), quality innovation also occurs (i.e., zt > 0).
Substituting (16) and (21) into rt = ρ+ gt yields
gt = (1− γ)nt + zt + γλ = α [(µ− 1) xt − φ]− ρ. (A.7)
2
Then, we combine (A.6) and (A.7) to solve for n(xt):
nt =
[(1− α)(µ− 1)− ρβ]xt − (1− α)φ+ ρ+ γλ
βxt − (1− γ)
. (A.8)
Substituting (A.8) into (A.5) yields
ẋt = γ
(1− α)φ− λ− ρ− [(1− α)(µ− 1)− β (λ+ ρ)]xt
β − (1− γ)/xt
. (A.9)
We assume β − (1 − γ)/xt > 0 for all xt > φ/ (µ− 1). Then, this equation has a unique
steady state that is stable if (1− α)φ− λ− ρ > 0 and (1− α)(µ− 1)− β (λ+ ρ) > 0 from
which we obtain ρ + λ < min {(1− α)φ, (1− α)(µ− 1)/β}. Then, ẋt = 0 yields x
∗ in (24).














which is obtained by combining (A.6) and (A.7) to solve for z(xt) and then setting zt = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. We know that the household consumption share is constant.
















































We then have the following two cases.
In the pre-industrial era land is the only available asset and we have sa,t(h) = sR,t (h) ≡




[γ − s∗c (h) + (1− γ) sa,t(h)] .
This differential equation in the pre-determined state variable sa,t(h) holds for all t ∈ [0, TN ]
with sa,t(h) ∈ (0, 1) if and only if the household consumption share s
∗
c (h) is always at the
value that makes the bracket zero so that ṡa,t(h) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, TN ]. Moreover, since
agents have perfect foresight and incorporate in their decisions all available information at
t = 0, the consumption share must jump at t = 0. This yields
s∗c (h) = γ + sR,0 (h) (1− γ)
3
for all t ∈ [0, TN ]. Thus, even though our scheme allows for trade of land, in equilibrium
households do not trade it and sR,t (h) = sR,0 (h) for all t ∈ [0, TN ]. Consequently, our first
result is that the pre-industrial wealth distribution is stationary and equal to the initial
distribution of land.
In the industrial era the factor payments (9)-(10) and Proposition 1 yield
ṡa,t(h) =
ρ (1 + ρΘ/µ)










where Θ ≡ βθ/(1−θ). The differential equation then holds for all t > TN with sa,t(h) ∈ (0, 1)
if and only if the household’s consumption share s∗c (h) jumps immediately to the value that








To complete the argument, we need to take a stand on the distribution of industrial wealth
at t = TN . To get started, we assume that such initial distribution tracks the distribution
of land. Thus, sa,TN (h) = R0(h)/R ≡ sR(h).
Gini coefficient of income. The income received by household h is given by
yt(h) = rtat(h) + wtLt = rtAtsa,t(h) + wtLt = rtAtsR(h) + wtLt.
We order households in ascending order of wealth and of income. The Lorenz curves of,






















The Gini coefficients of respectively, wealth and income are:








Substituting (A.10) into (A.11), and noting that
∫ h
0

















hdh = 0.5. Substituting the Gini coefficient of wealth into this expression yields












which is equation (26) in the main text.
Labor share of income. Using the Euler equation (3) and the aggregate labor income























(1− γ) 0 ≤ xt ≤ xN
ρ+gt
γρ
(1− γ + ρΘ/µ) xt > xN
.





to derive (27) in the main text.
Stationarity of the household wealth share with endogenous labor supply. The


















Collecting the consumption-wealth ratio Ct/At, and using the factor payments and Proposi-













































The new term here is the household’s relative labor supply, sl (h) ≡ lt (h) /lt, which is
constant. We thus have again that the bracket must be zero at all times, i.e., the proof of
stationarity of the wealth shares is mathematically the same as in the baseline model with
inelastic labor supply. The resulting phase-specific consumption share is






















As argued in the text, we can write this expression as

















= ϕ0 + ϕ1s
∗
a(h),
where the consumption-output ratio is given by Proposition 1.




[wtLt − η(rt − gt)at(h)] =
1
1 + η
[wtLt − η(rt − gt)AtsR(h)] .
5

















































(rt + ηgt)At + wtLt
sR(h) +
wtLt























(1 + η) lt
Lt
.
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